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Introduction	  Since	  the	  mid-­‐‑1980s,	  Muslims	   in	  England,	  especially	  boys	  and	  young	  men	  of	  Pakistani	  and	   Bangladeshi	   origin,	   have	   come	   to	   be	   regarded	   as	   ‘folk	   devils’	   or	   what	   Cohen	  (2002:2)	   refers	   to	   as	   ‘visible	   reminders	   of	  what	   we	   should	   not	   be’.	   	   Once	   compared	  positively	  with	   their	   African-­‐‑Caribbean	   counterparts	   as	  passive	   and	   law-­‐‑abiding,	   they	  have	   been	   recast	   in	   the	   public	   imagination	   as	   a	   threat	   to	   the	   social	   order.	   	   British	  Muslims	  are	  among	  the	  most	  deprived	  communities	  in	  the	  UK	  with	  46%	  (1.22	  million)	  of	  the	  Muslim	  population	  residing	  in	  the	  10%	  most	  deprived	  local	  authority	  districts	  in	  England	   (ONS	   2013).	   	   Pakistani	   and	   Bangladeshi	   boys	   and	  men,	   are	   also	   among	   the	  groups	  that	  have	  the	  lowest	  educational	  attainment	  and	  highest	  rates	  of	  unemployment	  (ONS	  2014).	  However,	  discourses	  of	  self-­‐‑segregation	  (Cantle	  2001;	  Denham	  2002)	  and	  global	  (in)security	  posed	  by	  the	  ‘war	  on	  terror’	  have	  positioned	  them	  simultaneously	  as	  the	  victims	  of	  cultural	  and	  religious	  practices	  and	  as	  a	  threat	  to	  the	  social	  order.	  	  Public	  and	  political	  anxieties	  about	  radicalisation	  and	   ‘extremism’–	   in	  circulation	   from	  the	  late	  1980s	  –	  intensified	  to	  a	  point	  of	  frenzy	  after	  the	  London	  transport	  bombings	  in	  July	   2005	   were	   attributed	   to	   ‘home-­‐‑grown’	   suicide-­‐‑bombers.	   	   Since	   then,	   Muslim	  communities	  have	  come	  under	  exceptional	  scrutiny	  and	  surveillance	  at	  the	  same	  time	  as	  their	   loyalty	   to	   the	   British	   state	   has	   been	   significantly	   questioned.	   Concerns	   about	  ‘Muslim	  extremism’	  have	  also	  intersected	  with	  national	  and	  European	  level	  discourses	  of	   integration.	   	   Across	   several	   European	   countries,	   political	   and	   social	   commentators	  have	  	  made	  arguments	  linking	  the	  	  ‘Muslimness’	  of	  their	  disadvantaged	  ethnic	  groups	  	  to	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predominant	   	   economic	  and	  political	  problems	   faced	  within	  and	  by	  European	  nation-­‐‑states	  since	  the	  1970s	  (see	  for	  example,	  Sarazzin	  2010).	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Young	   working	   class	   men	   have	   often	   been	   the	   focus	   of	   adult	   anxieties	   and	   fears,	  particularly	  in	  periods	  of	  economic	  crisis	  and	  social	  change	  in	  England	  (Pearson,	  1983;	  Hebdige,	  1979).	  	  Mods,	  Rockers,	  skinheads,	  muggers,	  hoodies,	  chavs	  and	  Asian	  gangs	  are	  among	   the	   list	   of	   antiheroes	   cited	   by	   Delamont	   (2000).	   Pearson	   (1983)	   also	   traces	   a	  long	  history,	  going	  back	  to	  the	  seventeenth	  century,	  of	  moral	  campaigners	  and	  political	  figures,	  comparing	  young	  people	  today	  with	  an	  apparently	  more	  disciplined,	   idealised	  youth	  in	  the	  past.	  	  	  	  Extending	  this	  theme,	  Cohen	  (2002)	  applied	  the	  concept	  of	  folk	  devil	  to	  a	  group	  of	  Mods	  and	  Rockers	  who,	  in	  the	  1960s	  and	  1970s,	  became	  scapegoated	  as	  the	   symbols	   of	   society’s	   ills.	   Through	   a	   spiralling	   sequence	   of	   media	   reports,	   public	  letters	   and	   public	   reactions,	   they	   came	   to	   be	   represented	   as	   a	   ‘threat	   to	   the	   nation’.	  	  Cohen	  drew	  on	  the	  notion	  of	  moral	  panic	  to	  explain	  this	  spiralling	  sequence:	  	   A	  condition,	  episode,	  person	  or	  groups	  of	  persons	  emerges	  to	  become	  defined	  as	  a	  threat	  to	  societal	  values	  and	  interests;	  its	  nature	  is	  presented	  in	  a	  stylized	  and	  stereotypical	   fashion	   by	   the	  mass	  media;	   the	  moral	   barricades	   are	  manned	   by	  editors,	  bishops,	  politicians	  and	  other	  right-­‐‑thinking	  people;	  socially	  accredited	  experts	  pronounce	  their	  diagnoses	  and	  solutions;	  ways	  of	  coping	  are	  evolved	  (or	  more	   often)	   resorted	   to;	   the	   condition	   then	   disappears,	   submerges	   or	  deteriorates	  and	  becomes	  more	  visible.	  (Cohen	  	  2002:9)	  	  Cohen’s	   notion	   of	   moral	   panic	   has	   been	   critiqued,	   evaluated	   and	   reassessed	   by	  researchers,	   including	   Cohen	   himself,	   in	   the	   light	   of	   new	   concepts	   and	   theories	   (see	  Garland	   2008	   for	   a	   review).	   Jefferson	   (2008)	   argues	   that	   Cohen’s	   original	   definition	  answered	   the	  what	   and	  who	   questions	  but	   the	  not	   the	  why:	   that	   is,	  why	  moral	  panics	  take	  root	  around	  particular	   folk	  devils	   in	  particular	  societies	  at	  particular	  moments	   in	  history.	  This	   is	   the	   central	   concern	   in	   this	   chapter.	  Drawing	  on	  Gramscian	   concepts	   	   I	  argue	  that	  Muslim	  boys,	  in	  particular,	  have	  come	  to	  be	  demonized	  in	  England,	  at	  a	  time	  of	   significant	   economic,	   political	   and	   cultural	   global	   change.	   Their	   emergence	   as	   folk	  devils	  is	  located	  in	  the	  crisis	  politics	  that	  have	  gripped	  the	  UK	  since	  the	  1970s	  but	  also	  in	  the	  related	  and	  interlinked	  global	  shifts	  marked	  by	  the	  end	  of	  Cold	  War	  politics	  and	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the	  emergence	  of	   Islam	  as	  a	  new,	  global	   enemy.	  The	   chapter	   is	   structured	  as	   follows:	  	  the	   first	  section	  briefly	  discusses	  the	  theoretical	  assumptions	  and	  concepts	   that	   frame	  my	  analysis;	   the	  second	  section	  considers	  the	  question	  of	  how	  and	  why	  Muslims	  have	  come	   to	  symbolise	  a	   threat	   to	   ‘the	  West’	   since	   the	  end	  of	   the	  Cold	  War.	   	   	   In	   the	   third	  section,	   I	   review	   the	   English	   policy	   and	   political	   context	   that	   has	   given	   rise	   to	   the	  construction	   of	   young	   Muslims	   as	   the	   ‘unacceptable	   other’	   of	   ‘Western	   values’	   of	  ‘freedom’	  and	  ‘democracy’	  (Shain	  2013).	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Theoretical	  assumptions	  and	  framing	  	  	  A	  key	  theoretical	  assumption	  underpinning	  this	  chapter	   is	   that	   the	  economic,	  political	  and	   social	   forces	   that	   have	   given	   rise	   to	   the	   contemporary	   status	   of	   Muslim	   young	  people	  as	  a	   social	   threat	  are	  global	   and	   systemic	  and	   that	   the	  post-­‐‑Cold	  War	   realities	  and	  dynamics	  of	  US	  global	  hegemony	  form	  a	  central	  backdrop	  to	  the	  current	  status	  of	  Muslims	  boys	  as	  folk	  devils	  in	  England.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  The	   Gramscian	   concept	   of	   hegemony	   emphasises	   the	   way	   a	   particular	   ‘world	   view’,	  comes	  to	  secure	  the	  domination	  of	  a	  ruling	  elite	  or	  ‘ruling	  bloc’	  within	  a	  state	  or	  systems	  of	  states.	  	  A	  dominant	  group,	  itself,	  often	  a	  coalition	  of	  competing	  interests,	  may	  lead	  by	  force	   but	   this	   leadership	   is	   likely	   to	   be	   short-­‐‑lived.	   To	   achieve	   longer	   term	   success,	   a	  ruling	  bloc	  needs	  to	  secure	  and	  maintain	  the	  consent	  of	  the	  majority	  of	  the	  subordinate	  class,	  though	  this	  hegemony	  is	  never	  complete.	  	  For	  Gramsci,	  the	  state,	  which	  comprises	  political	   society	   (the	   police	   and	   judiciary)	   and	   civil	   society	   (family,	   media	   and	  education)	   is	   the	   central	   arena	   where	   this	   consent	   is	   manufactured;	   it	   is	   ‘hegemony	  protected	  by	  the	  armour	  of	  coercion’	  (Gramsci	  1971:262-­‐‑3).	  That	  is,	  even	  in	  periods	  of	  relative	  consensus,	  coercion	  always	  remains	  in	  reserve.	  	  It	  is	  in	  the	  realm	  of	  civil	  society	  however,	  that	  'the	  successful	  mobilisation	  and	  reproduction	  of	  the	  active	  consent	  of	  the	  dominated	  groups	  by	  the	  ruling	  class	  'takes	  place'	  through	  their	  exercise	  of	  intellectual,	  moral	  and	  political	  leadership'	  (Jessop	  1982:146).	  	  	  	  	  
	  	  Some	   theorists	   argue	   that	   we	   are	   now	   ‘post	   hegemony’	   in	   the	   sense	   that	   ‘neoliberal	  regimes	  construct	  and	  rely	  upon	  new	  forms	  of	  rule	  for	  which	  ideology	  no	  longer	  plays	  a	  part’	  (Beasley-­‐‑Murray	  2003:	  118)	  	  but	  I	  agree	  with	  Johnson	  (2007)	  that	  hegemony	  has	  never	  been	  a	  more	  relevant	  concept	  for	  understanding	  the	  post	  9/11	  world	  order	  and	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the	  construction	  of	  political	  Islam	  as	  a	  threat	  to	  the	  social	  order.	  	  	  	  The	  neo-­‐‑conservative	  Project	   for	   a	   New	   American	   Century	   (PNAC,	   1997)	   predated	   9/11	   but	   its	   various	  elements	  and	  goals	  were	  subsequently	  brought	  together	  and	  legitimated	  via	  the	  ‘war	  on	  terror’.	  These	  goals	  included	  but	  were	  not	  limited	  to:	  an	  emphasis	  US	  global	  leadership	  	  	  as	   the	   goal	   of	   its	   foreign	   policy;	   a	   commitment	   to	   spreading/exporting	   US	   values	   of	  (market)	   freedom	  and	   liberal	  democracy;	   investment	   in	   the	  military	  as	  the	   foundation	  of	  US	  global	  power;	  and	  a	  pre-­‐‑emptive	  strike	  doctrine.	  	  The	  ‘war	  on	  terror’,	  the	  practical	  exercise	   of	   the	   PNAC	   project,	   enabled	   a	   redefinition	   of	   the	   global	   ‘enemy’	   and	   the	  security	  environment	  in	  a	  post-­‐‑Cold	  War	  environment.	  	  	  As	  Johnson	  (2007)	  argues,	  the	  post	  9/11	  speeches	  of	  George	  Bush	  and	  Tony	  Blair	  were	  critical	  in	  building	  consent	  for	  subsequent	   military	   actions	   through	   the	   linking,	   ideologically,	   of	   many	   familiar	  elements	  including:	  	  	  	  	  	   	  …	  	  	  	  a	  hatred	  of	  the	  Other,	  an	  absolute	  and	  racialized	  division	  between	  good	  and	  evil,	  powerfully	  emotive	  constructions	  of	  nations,	   forms	  of	  gendered	  masculine	  address,	   the	   impersonation	  of	   national-­‐‑popular	   heroes,	   a	  wholesale	   absolution	  for	  consumerist	  ways	  of	  life	   ...and	  a	  more	  than	  implied	  civilizational	  superiority	  associated	  with	  religion.	  	  (Johnson	  2007)	  	  	  The	  speeches	  were	  not	  merely	  discursive	  but	  enabled	  a	  geopolitical	  strategy	  aimed	  at	  the	  global	  promotion	  of	  US	   centred	  neoliberal	   globalization	   to	  be	  presented	  as	  a	   fight	  ‘for	  our	  democratic	  values	  and	  way	  of	   	  life’	  (White	  House	  2002:31);	  the	  core	  ideas	  and	  values	   promoted	   by	   Bush	   and	   Blair	   had	   material	   consequences	   both	   globally	  (bombings;	   military	   invasions,	   regime	   change)	   and	   domestically	   (forced	   repatriation,	  new	  forms	  of	  security	  and	  surveillance,	  	  the	  general	  curtailment	  of	  civil	  liberties).	  	  Many	  including,	  Democrats	  in	  the	  US	  and	  Labour	  party	  members	  in	  the	  UK,	  were	  	  ‘won	  over’	  to	  support	  the	  wars	  in	  Afghanistan	  in	  2001	  and	  Iraq	  in	  2003	  and	  alternative	  voices	  were	  rhetorically	  and	  actively	  silenced,	  for	  example,	  as	  ‘terrorist	  	  sympathisers’.	  	  	  	  It	   is	  also	  now	  widely	  accepted	  that	   the	  military	   invasions	   in	  Afghanistan	  and	  Iraq	  and	  regime-­‐‑change	   in	   Libya	   and	   Syria	  were	   centred	   on	   promoting	   US	   economic	   interests	  including	   the	   seizure	   of	   oil	   supplies	   and	   the	   privatization	   of	   public	   services	   in	   the	  interest	   of	   transnational	   corporations	   (Johnson,	   2007).	   This	   maintenance	   of	   US	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hegemony	  and	  positioning	  in	  a	  post-­‐‑Cold	  War	  era	  forms	  an	  important	  backdrop	  for	  the	  contemporary	   construction	   of	   Muslims	   as	   problems	   to	   be	   contained	   and	   managed.	  However,	   to	  understand	  why	  specific	   ethnic	  groups	  have	  been	   the	   targets	  of	  punitive	  and	   coercive	   state	   policies	   within	   different	   regional/national	   contexts,	   (for	   example,	  	  Arabs	  and	  Asians	  in	  the	  US,	  Lebanese	  young	  people	  in	  Australia,	  Turks	  in	  Germany	  and	  Holland,	  North	  Africans	   in	  France)	  we	   need	   to	   take	   account	   of	   the	   particular	   colonial	  histories	   that	  have	  shaped	  the	  development	  of	   these	  metropolitan	  contexts	  and	  young	  people’s	   economic	   locations	   and	   social/cultural	   experiences	  within	   them.	   	   	   Gramsci’s	  concepts	  of	  Historical	  specificity	  and	  articulation	  are	  relevant	  here.	  	  Historical	  specificity	  refers	   to	   the	   particular	   economic,	   political	   and	   ideological	   makeup	   of	   a	   society,	   at	   a	  particular	  moment	  in	  time.	  By	  articulation,	  Gramsci	  referred	  to	  the	  inter-­‐‑relationship	  of	  economic,	  political	  and	  ideological	  structures	  in	  specific	  historical	  periods	  inferring	  that	  economic	   structures	  do	  not	  simply	  determine	  political	  policies	  and	  cultural	  processes	  but	   shape,	   and	   in	   turn	   can	   be	   shaped	   by	   them.	   They	   become	   interlinked	   in	   specific	  periods	  to	  support	  particular	  hegemonic	  projects.	  	  	  In	   the	   case	   of	   England,	   two	  major	   interlinked	   developments	   have	   been	   important	   in	  shaping	   	   the	   course	   of	   social	   policy	   in	   the	   last	   50	   years	   and	   are	   pertinent	   to	  making	  sense	  of	  why	  and	  how	  Muslims,	  predominantly	  Pakistanis	  and	  Bangladeshis	  have	  come	  to	  be	  regarded	  as	  a	  ‘problem’;	  the	  first	  is	  the	  significant	  economic	  decline	  that	  followed	  on	   from	   the	   end	   of	   the	   initial	   boom	  of	   the	   post-­‐‑World	  War	   II	   period.	   This	   decline	   is	  associated	  with	  the	  economic	  restructuring	  that	   involved	  a	  shift	   in	   the	  economic	  base	  from	   a	   manufacturing	   to	   a	   service	   and	   financial	   sector.	   Beginning	   in	   the	   1960s	   and	  developing	   as	   a	   result	   of	   increased	   competition	   from	   national	   economies	   such	   as	  Germany	  in	  the	  1970s	  and	  China	  and	  India	  in	  the	  1980s,	  this	  entailed	  significant	  costs	  in	  terms	  of	  unemployment	  and	   job	   insecurity	   that	  have	  had	  a	   lasting	   legacy	   in	   inner	  city	  areas	  in	  England.	  	  	  	  	  	  The	   second	   development	   is	   the	   loss	   of	   Britain’s	   colonies	   at	   the	   end	   of	  World	  War	   II,	  which	   was	   largely	   followed	   by	   the	   active	   recruitment	   of	   workers	   from	   the	   former	  colonies	   to	   fill	   labour	   shortages	   created	   in	   the	   immediate	   aftermath	   of	   the	   war.	  However,	  the	  loss	  of	  its	  colonies	  did	  not	  necessarily	  lead	  to	  a	  post-­‐‑colonial	  state	  identity	  and	  culture	   for	   the	  British	   state	   in	   the	   initial	  decades.	  As	  Gilroy	   (2004)	  has	  argued,	   a	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post-­‐‑colonial	  melancholia	  –	  the	  repeated	  failure	  to	  let	  of	  its	  imperial	  past	  –	  has	  shaped	  British	   state	   relations	   and	   policy	   in	   relation	   to	   its	   ethnic	   minorities.	   Imperial	   and	  colonial	   notions	   of	   a	   ‘superior	   British	   way	   of	   life’	   	   and	   the	   racialised	   inferiority	   or	  difference	  of	  minority	  groups	  have	  been	  re-­‐‑articulated	  through	  modern	  constructions	  of	  minorities	  as	  ‘backward’,	  ‘untrustworthy’,	  ‘	  hypersexualised’	  (CCCS	  1982;	  Layton	  Henry	  1992;	  Gilroy	  2004)	  	  and	  more	  recently	  as	  	  ‘	  terrorist	  suspects’	  and	  ‘extremists’	  .	  	  Notions	  of	  a	  superior	  ‘British	  way	  of	  life’	  are	  also	  embedded	  in	  social	  policies	  of	  integration	  and	  cohesion,	   and	   the	   ‘British	   values’	   that	   are	   promoted	   through	   the	   education	   system.	  	  	  Through	  these	  soft	  forms	  of	  control,	  combined	  with	  the	  coercive	  and	  punitive	  measures	  justified	   by	   the	   British	   ‘war	   on	   terror’,	   marginalized	   young	   people	   have	   come	   to	  symbolise	   the	   Other	   of	   Britishness.	   Muslims	   girls	   and	   women	   especially,	   those	   who	  wear	  their	  religion	  politically,	  through	  the	  niqab,	  hijab	  or	   jilbab	  have	  become	  the	  most	  visible	   symbols	   of	   crisis	   and	   decline	   at	   a	   time	   of	   intense	   economic	   uncertainty.	   This	  argument	  is	  developed	  in	  the	  following	  sections.	  	  	  
	  
	  
From	   Cold	   War	   politics	   to	   the	   re-­‐‑articulation	   of	   Islamic	   threat:	   US	   global	  
hegemony	  	  	  Current	  constructions	  of	  Islam	  as	  ‘evil’	  and	  ‘dangerous’	  are	  not	  new,	  of	  course,	  but	  have	  a	  long	  history	  going	  back	  to	  the	  period	  of	  the	  Crusades	  (11th	  –	  13th	  century)	  when	  Islam	  was	  described	  as	  ‘evil	  incarnate’	  and	  Turkish	  converts	  to	  	  Islam	  as	  a	  ‘vile	  race’	  by	  Pope	  Urban	  II	  who	  led	  the	  first	  Crusade.	  	  Notions	  of	  Islam	  as	  monolithic,	  violent	  and	  uniquely	  sexist	   (Said,	   1978)	   have	   been	   reproduced	   in	   historically	   contingent	   ways	   since	   the	  Crusades.	  	  For	  example,	  they	  were	  rearticulated	  and	  reworked	  during	  the	  19th	  and	  20th	  century	   to	   justify	   British	   and	  European	   colonialist	   projects	   and	   continue	   to	   underpin	  contemporary	  understandings	  of	  Muslims	  as	  ‘suspect’.	  	  However,	  there	  have	  also	  been	  periods	  when	  Muslims	  were	  differently	  constructed	  for	  example,	   during	   the	   time	   of	   the	   Soviet	   invasion	   of	   Afghanistan	   (1979	   –	   1989)	   the	  Mujahidin,	  backed	  and	  trained	  by	  the	  US	  (later	  regarded	  as	  terrorists),	  were	  referred	  to	  by	   US	   President	   Reagan	   in	   the	   1980s	   as	   ‘freedom	   fighters’	   (Ahmad	   2006).	   	   This	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construction	  of	  Muslim	  political	  activists	  as	  ‘our	  friends’,	  occurred	  during	  the	  Cold	  War	  period	  (1945-­‐‑1991)	  when	  the	  Soviets	  were	  the	  prime	  competitor	  of	  the	  USA.	  	  The	  collapse	  of	  state	  socialist	  regimes	  in	  Eastern	  Europe	  and	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  in	  1991	  radically	   transformed	   the	   geopolitical	   and	   geoeconomic	   contexts	   of	   world	   politics	  	  ending	  the	  bipolar	  structure	  of	  world	  politics	  with	  the	  United	  States	  now	  acknowledged	  as	  the	  only	  superpower	  –	  militarily,	  especially	  (Wallace	  2002;	  Harvey	  2003).	  	  Post-­‐‑Cold	  War	  wars	  and	  campaigns	  have	  been	  centred	  on	  the	  manoeuvres	  of	  the	  USA,	  and	  its	  allies	  in	  Europe,	  over	  the	  division	  of	  resources	  and	  political/military	  control	  of	  Afro-­‐‑Eurasia.	  	  These	   interventions	   have	   enabled	   the	   USA	   to	   gain	   a	   strong	   foothold	   in	   the	   lands	  between	  Western	  Europe	  to	  the	  west,	  Russian	  Federation	  to	  the	  north,	  China	  to	  the	  east	  and	   sub-­‐‑Saharan	   Africa	   to	   the	   south,	   and	   turn	   this	   energy	   rich	   strategic	   region	  increasingly	  into	  an	  American	  ‘sphere	  of	  influence’.	  	  	  	  The	  strengthening	  of	  US	  global	  control	  has	  relied	  as	  much	  on	  politics	  and	  ideology	  as	  on	  economic	   and	   military	   power.	  	   As	   Wallace	   (2002:109)	   	   summarises,	   this	   ‘hegemony	  rests	   upon	   a	   range	   of	   resources,	   of	   hard	   military	   power,	   economic	   weight,	   financial	  commitments,	   and	   the	   soft	   currency	   of	   hegemonic	   values,	   cultural	   influence	   and	  prestige.’	   	   	  US	  hegemony,	   since	  1945,	  has	  been	  built	  on	   the	  ability	   to	  homogenise	   the	  political	  cultures	  of	  its	  allies	  around	  sets	  of	  ideological	  values	  and	  cultural	  perceptions	  constructed	   to	   serve	   US	   interests.	  	   	   This	   has	   largely	   been	   achieved	   via	   symbolic	  constructions,	  	  	  loosely	  connected	  to	  the	  Second	  World	  War	  experience	  and	  a	  Western-­‐‑centric	  interpretation	  of	  the	  so-­‐‑called	  ‘clash	  of	  civilisations’.	  	  	  	  During	  the	  Cold	  War	  period,	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  and	  Communist	  ideology	  were	  portrayed	  throughout	  the	  capitalist	  West,	  as	  the	  evil	  force	  that	  threatened	  ‘western	  freedoms’	  and	  ‘free	   enterprise’.	  	   	   However,	   since	   1979,	   a	   key	   historical	   turning	   point	   in	   the	   West’s	  relationship	   to	   Islam,	   a	   number	   of	   factors	   coalesced	   to	   replace	   the	   communist	   threat	  with	  political	  Islam.	  This	  included	  the	  onset	  of	  the	  Iranian	  revolution,	  in	  1979,	  and	  the	  Soviet	   invasion	  of	  Afghanistan	  after	  which	  western	   trained	   Islamic	  militants	  began	   to	  pose	  a	  sporadic	  threat	  to	  US	  global	  hegemony.	  With	  the	  demonization	  of	  political	  Islam	  from	   the	   late	   1980s	   onwards,	   Islam	   and	   fundamentalism	   became	   linked	   and	   ‘Islamic	  fundamentalism’	   and	   ‘Islamic	   terror’	   were	   progressed	   into	   dominant	   hate	   themes	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From	   the	   numbers	   game	   to	   terrorist	   suspects	   –	   the	   changing	   status	   of	   young	  
Muslims	  in	  England.	  	  	  	  Since	  the	  1950s,	  Muslim	  communities	  have	  consistently	  been	  characterised	  as	  policy	  problems	  in	  England.	  	  	  	  In	  the	  1950s	  and	  1960s,	  this	  was	  as	  ‘black’	  migrant	  workers	  in	  economic	  competition	  for	  jobs	  and	  services.	  	  From	  the	  1970s,	  themes	  of	  ‘cultural	  deficit/	  clash/alienation’	  were	  applied	  to	  read	  the	  children	  of	  migrant	  workers	  and	  British-­‐‑born	  minority	  youth	  as	  social	  problems.	  	  	  In	  the	  1970s	  and	  1980s	  African-­‐‑Caribbean	  young	  people	  were	  the	  main	  (but	  not	  the	  only)	  targets	  of	  the	  state’s	  containment	  policies	  –	  both	  soft	  and	  coercive;	  however,	  since	  the	  mid-­‐‑1980s	  	  as	  the	  discourse	  shifted	  from	  race	  to	  faith,	  	  	  Asian	  Muslims	  	  and	  Asylum	  seekers	  	  have	  become	  the	  most	  visible	  symbols	  of	  crisis	  and	  change	  in	  the	  UK.	  	  	  While	  the	  targets	  of	  containment	  policies	  have	  changed	  since	  the	  1950s,	  	  	  there	  have	  been	  repeated	  calls,	  through	  state	  policies,	  on	  minorities	  to	  assimilate	  into	  a	  (superior)	  ‘British	  way	  of	  life’	  (Grosvenor	  1997)	  and	  these	  calls	  have	  been	  more	  pronounced	  in	  periods	  of	  economic	  uncertainty	  and	  geopolitical	  dislocations	  (Gilroy	  2004).	  	  
The	  numbers	  game	  	  	  Ethnic	  minorities	  made	  up	  14%	  of	  the	  population	  in	  2011,	  (ONS	  2013),	  but	  this	  figure	  looks	  set	  to	  rise	  to	  20%	  by	  2051	  (Tran	  2010).	  	  In	  2011,	  2.7	  million	  identified	  as	  Muslim	  (ONS	  2014)	   up	   from	  1.8	  million	   in	   2001.	   	   Britain’s	   long	  history	   of	   black	   immigration	  goes	  back	  500	  years	  (Fryer	  1984)	  but	  it	  was	  in	  the	  post-­‐‑Second	  World	  War	  period	  that	  large	  numbers	  of	  black	  workers	  were	  actively	  recruited	  by	  the	  British	  state	  to	  fill	  labour	  shortages	   following	   the	   economic	   boom	   of	   this	   period	   (Anwar	   1986;	   Layton-­‐‑Henry	  1992).	   	   In	   the	  1950s	  and	  1960s,	  African-­‐‑Caribbeans,	   Indians	  and	  Pakistanis	  (and	   later	  Bangladeshis)	  arrived	  to	  take	  up	  jobs	  –	  a	  small	  minority	  in	  professions	  as	  doctors	  and	  teachers	   but	   the	   majority	   in	   unskilled	   labouring	   work	   such	   as	   manufacturing	   and	  textiles.	   	   	  These	  were	  often	  the	   jobs	  the	   indigenous	  workers	  were	  not	  prepared	  to	  do,	  and	  involved	  immigrants	  working	  unsocial	  hours	  often	  for	  less	  pay	  (Solomos	  1992).	  	  As	  the	  migrants	  were	  motivated	  by	  the	  need	  to	   find	  work,	   they	  tended	  to	  settle	   in	  urban	  areas	  where	   jobs	   and	   housing	  were	   readily	   available;	   these	   areas	   have	   subsequently	  suffered	  most	   from	   the	   decline	   in	  manufacturing	   since	   the	   1970s	  with	   the	   long	   term	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impacts	   including	   widespread	   unemployment	   and	   accompanying	   disadvantage	   in	  educational	  and	  labour	  markets	  for	  the	  later	  generations.	  	  	  	  As	  is	  now	  well	  documented,	  black	  commonwealth	  immigrants	  arriving	  in	  Britain	  to	  help	  re-­‐‑build	  the	  economy	  after	  the	  Second	  World	  War,	  received	  a	  warm	  welcome	  but	  were	  soon	   treated	   with	   suspicion	   and	   hostility	   as	   competition	   for	   jobs	   and	   services	   grew.	  	  	  	  	  Throughout	   the	   1950s	   and	   1960s,	   public	   and	   private	   debates	   began	   to	   focus	   on	   the	  extent	   of	   black	   immigration	   and	   its	   supposed	   impact	   on	   housing,	   the	   welfare	   state,	  crime	   and	   social	   problems.	   This	   racialisation	   of	   immigration	   was	   not	   a	   simple	  reworking	  of	  old	  colonial	  racism	  but	  actively	  produced	  by	  the	  state	  (Solomos	  	  1992)	  as	  the	  signs	  of	  economic	  and	  political	  decline	  began	  to	  emerge.	  	  	  	  Whether	   identified	  as	  Keynesian	  (following	  the	  principles	  of	  economist	   John	  Maynard	  Keynes)	   or	   ‘embedded	   liberalism’	   (e.g.	   Harvey	   2009),	   the	   set	   of	   policies,	   pursued	   by	  both	   Labour	   and	  Conservative	   governments	   from	  1945	  until	   the	   1960s	   had	   been	   the	  result	  of	  high	  rates	  of	  economic	  growth	  which,	  accompanied	  by	  period	  of	  political	  and	  ideological	  consensus,	  lasted	  until	  the	  end	  of	  the	  1960s	  when	  the	  growth	  slowed	  down	  and	  economic	  crises	  ensued.	  	  	  Hall	  et	  al	  (1978)	  argue	  that	  the	  end	  of	  the	  post-­‐‑war	  liberal	  consensus	  created	  space	  for	  a	  new	   form	   of	   political	   leadership	   that	   required	   a	   more	   coercive	   state	   approach	   to	  manage	   the	   economic	   and	   political	   crisis	   caused	   by	   the	   decline	   of	   Britain’s	  manufacturing	  base	   in	   the	  global	   economy.	  The	   conservative	   ‘New	  Right’	   government	  led	   by	   Margaret	   Thatcher	   took	   up	   that	   space	   in	   1979,	   setting	   out	   to	   find	   a	   radical	  solution	  to	  the	  economic	  decline	  and	  accompanying	  social	  and	  political	  problems.	  The	  policies	   of	   the	   Thatcher	   administration	   played	   a	   leading	   role	   in	   creating	   consent	   for	  what	  later	  came	  to	  be	  known	  as	  a	  ‘neoliberal’	  and	  ‘post-­‐‑welfarist’	  agenda	  which	  set	  out	  to	  free	  capital	  from	  the	  constraints	  of	  state	  ownership	  and	  investment,	  and	  interference	  by	  unions.	  What	  followed	  was	  a	  radical	  restructuring	  of	  workers’	  rights	  and	  real	  wages	  in	  order	  to	  keep	  investments	  profitable	  for	  the	  capitalist	  economy.	  Similar	  policies	  were	  introduced	   in	   the	   US	   and	   other	   leading	   capitalist	   economies	   in	   order	   to	   halt	   the	  declining	   rate	   of	  profit	   and	   to	  make	   investment	   profitable	   enough	   for	   capitalists.	  The	  Keynesian	  phase	  had	  emphasised	  state	  planning	  and	  in	  some	  instances	  state	  ownership	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of	   key	   sectors	   but	   these	   new	   neo-­‐‑liberal	   measures	   were	   underpinned	   by	   a	   global	  monetarism	   that	   was	   promoted	   by	   neoliberal	   economists	   such	   as	   Friedman.	   The	  neoliberal	   project	   set	   out	   to	   disembed	   capital	   from	   these	   constraints	   (Harvey,	   2009)	  and	   was	   put	   into	   practice	   by	   now	   right-­‐‑wing	   political	   elite	   to	   enforce	   neoliberal	  restructuring	  on	  workers.	  	  	  Race	  was	  a	   central	  political	   symbol	   in	   the	  New	  Right’s	  manufacture	  of	   consent	   for	   its	  project	   of	   ‘rolling	   back	   the	   state’.	   Moral	   panics	   about	   black	   ‘criminals	   and	   muggers’	  helped	   to	   legitimate	   coercive	   state	  measures	   aimed	   at	   the	   population	   in	   general,	   but	  particularly	  targeted	  disadvantaged	  groups	  that	  were	  also	  the	  most	  severely	  affected	  by	  the	   rising	   unemployment.	   The	   increased	   surveillance	   of	   the	   population	  was	   achieved	  through	   measures	   such	   as	   ‘stop	   and	   search’,	   but	   these	   disproportionately	   targeted	  African-­‐‑Caribbean	  men,	  and	  as	  a	  consequence	  led	  to	  further	  unrest	  in	  towns	  and	  cities	  in	   the	  1980s.	  By	   the	  mid-­‐‑1980s,	  African-­‐‑Caribbean	  youth	  were	  being	   characterised	   in	  policy	   and	  media	   discourse	   as	   a	   ticking	   time	   bomb	   (Solomos	   and	   Back	   1996)	   and	   a	  threat,	   along	  with	   trade	  union	  power	  and	   (Irish	  Republican)	   terrorism,	   to	   the	   ‘British	  way	  of	  life’.	  	  	  
	  
From	  black	  to	  Muslim	  folk	  devils	  	  	  Thatcherite	   constructions	   divided	   Britain	   into	   a	   privileged	   nation	   of	   ‘good’,	  ‘hardworking’	  citizens	  and	  a	  contained	  and	  subordinated	  nation	  which	  included	  ethnic	  minorities	  and	  much	  of	  the	  unskilled	  white	  working	  class	  outside	  the	  South	  East	  (Jessop	  2003).	   	   Through	   repeated	   references	   to	   criminality	   and	   deviance,	   young	   black	   men	  came	  to	  be	  the	  prime	  visible	  symbols	  crisis	  and	  change.	  However,	  from	  the	  1980s,	  the	  British	  discourse	  on	  minorities	  began	   to	   shift	   from	  ethnicity	   towards	  religion.	   	  Young	  Muslim	   men	   are	   still	   sometimes	   regarded	   and	   passive	   and	   studious,	   but	  overwhelmingly	  	  constructed	  as	  dangerous.	  This	  re-­‐‑racialisation	  of	  working	  class	  youth	  as	  a	  ‘problem’	  needs	  to	  be	  read	  in	  the	  context	  of	  the	  above	  mentioned	  	   ‘religious	  turn’	  which	  emerged	  in	  the	  space	  created	  by	  the	  end	  of	  Cold	  War	  politics	  and	  the	  demise	  of	  the	   former	   Soviet	   Eastern	   bloc	   in	   1991.	   In	   England,	   the	   ‘Rushdie	   affair’	   (the	   public	  protests	   in	  response	   to	  the	  publication	  of	   	   	   Salman	  Rushdie’s	  1988	  novel,	  The	  Satanic	  
Verses)	  was	  a	  major	  catalyst	  in	  the	  politicisation	  of	  Muslim	  identities.	  Groups	  previously	  
12  
  
identifying	   as	   Pakistani,	  Mirpuri	   or	   Bangladeshi	  were	   now	   defined	   and	   some	   defined	  themselves	  as	  Muslims	  (Saghal	  and	  Yuval-­‐‑Davis,	  1992).	  	  The	  Rushdie	  affair	  served	  as	  a	  pivot	  for	  public	  and	  political	  debates	  about	  preserving	  a	  (white)	  British	  ‘way	  of	  life’,	  protecting	  western	  values	  of	  freedom	  and	  liberalism	  against	  alien,	   uncivilised,	   uncultured	   and	   misogynistic	   Muslims.	   	   The	   debates	   drew	   on	   and	  revived	  colonial	  ideas	  of	  the	  ‘backwardness’	  of	  Muslims	  which	  helped	  to	  refuel	  debates	  about	  the	  threat	  posed	  by	  unrestricted	  immigration.	  	  Followed	  by	  the	  Gulf	  War	  in	  1991,	  the	  Bradford	  riots	  in	  1995,	  this	  was	  a	  important	  turning	  point	  for	  British	  Muslims.	  	  	  By	   the	   time	   the	   New	   Labour	   government	   was	   elected	   in	   1997,	   concerns	   were	   being	  expressed	  about	  the	  growing	  inequalities	  resulting	  from	  the	  neoliberal	  reforms	  pursued	  by	   three	   successive	   Conservative	   governments.	   With	   an	   expressed	   commitment	   to	  tackling	   social	   exclusion	   and	   race	   inequality,	   the	   Blairite	   ‘Third	   Way’	   between	  neoliberalism	  and	  social	  democracy	  looked	  set	  to	  deliver	  on	  the	  	  promise	  of	  ‘equality	  for	  all’.	  However,	  as	  a	  number	  of	  analyses	  have	  shown,	  New	  Labour’s	  policies	  did	  much	  to	  slow	  down	  the	  onset	  of	  the	  2008	  crisis	  but	  did	  not	  alter	  the	  broad	  patterns	  of	  structural	  inequality.	   	   New	   Labour	   governments	   also,	   especially	   from	   2001,	   posed	  multiculturalism	   and	   ethnic	   identification	   as	   a	   threat	   to	   ‘the	   nation’,	   and	   introduced	  some	   of	   the	   most	   draconian	   anti-­‐‑immigration	   and	   anti-­‐‑terror	   legislation	   that	   the	  country	  has	  ever	  seen.	  	  The	  ambitious	  project	  of	  redefining	  Britishness	  around	  notions	  of	   ‘active	   citizenship’,	   ‘rights	   and	   responsibilities’	   and	   paid	   work	   (Worley	   2005)	  positioned	   some	   groups,	   notably	  Muslims,	   asylum-­‐‑seekers	   and	   generally	   those	   not	   in	  paid	  employment,	  as	  outside	  the	  nation	  and	  its	  interests.	  	  	  	  New	  Labour’s	  approach	  to	  dealing	  with	  ‘race’	  and	  minorities	  in	  its	  second	  term	  (2001	  to	  2005)	  has	  been	  described	  variously	  as	  ‘the	  new	  assimilationism’	  (Back	  et	  al	  2002,	  452)	  and	   as	   naïve	   multiculturalism	   (Gillborn	   2001	   19).	   	   	   Flirtations	   with	   multicultural	  democracy	  were	  combined	  with	  melancholic	  appeals	  to	  imperial	  grandness	  to	  produce	  a	   contradictory	  vision	  of	   ‘the	  British	  nation’.	  Renewed	  calls	  on	  minorities	   to	   integrate	  into	  a	  ‘British	  way	  of	  life’	  	  	  following	  the	  ‘riots’	  in	  2001,	  were	  given	  further	  fuel	  after	  the	  9/11	  terrorist	  attacks	  were	  officially	  connected	  to	   Islamist	   terrorism	  and	  the	  USA	  and	  Britain	  officially	  declared	  a	  ‘war	  on	  terror’.	  	  The	  project	  of	  redefining	  British	  citizenship	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around	   notions	   of	   cohesion	   and	   integration	   and	   ‘British	   values’	   was	   largely	  conceptualised	   and	   pursued	   through	   policies	   on	   immigration	   	   (Home	   Office	   2002).	  	  	  However,	  the	  meaning	  of	  	  New	  Labour’s	  Britishness	  was	  hard	  to	  pin	  down,	  shifting	  from	  ‘fair	   play	   and	   tolerance’	   to	   ‘hard	   work,	   effort	   and	   enterprise’	   (Brown,	   2006)	   and	  sometimes,	  	  the	  Other	  of	  genital	  mutilation	  or	  forced	  marriages.	  	  	  	  	  Gillborn	   describes	   new	   Labour’s	   final	   term	   (2005–2010)	   as	   an	   era	   of	   ‘aggressive	  majoritarianism’,	  when	  ‘the	  rights	  and	  perspectives	  of	  a	  white	  majority	  were	  asserted’	  and,	  in	  the	  context	  of	  the	  ‘war	  on	  terror’	  and	  its	  securitisation	  of	  everyday	  life,	  they	  now	  felt	  able	  to	  freely	  voice	  these	  prejudices	  in	  the	  name	  of	  ‘integration’	  or	  ‘security’	  (2008,	  81).	   	  The	  7/7	  bombings,	  Britain’s	  own	  ‘war	  on	  terror’,	  were	  a	  critical	  factor	  in	  shaping	  the	   intense	  and	  unprecedented	  focus	  on	  young	  Muslims	  as	   the	   ‘enemy	  within’.	   Islamic	  modes	  of	  dress,	  forced	  marriage	  and	  genital	  mutilation,	  already	  questioned,	  became	  the	  subjects	  of	  increasing	  and	  detailed	  debate,	  not	  only	  in	  Britain	  but	  across	  Europe.	  	  While	  Britain	  has	  not	  quite	  taken	  the	  steps	  that	  France	  has	  in	  banning	  the	  niqab,	  evidence	  of	  the	   horrific	   mistreatment	   of	   Iraqi	   prisoners	   in	   what	   has	   been	   called	   Britain’s	   “Abu	  Ghraib”	  (Cobain	  2010)	  was	  revealing	  of	  the	  state’s	  coercive	  power.	  This	  judicial	  abuse,	  torture	   and	  war	   crime,	   alongside	   ‘home’	  measures,	   including	   forced	   repatriation	   and	  detention	   without	   trial,	   maintained	   the	   threat	   of	   state	   violence	   alongside	   a	   series	   of	  ‘soft’	  or	  consensual	  measures	  to	  manage	  and	  contain	  ‘problem’	  populations.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  The	   2008	   economic	   and	   financial	   crisis	  was	   the	   platform	   for	   the	   election	   of	   the	   new	  Coalition	  government	  in	  May	  2010.	  With	  the	  mantra	  of	   ‘clearing	  up	  the	  mess	  inherited	  from	  the	  previous	  government’,	  the	  Conservative-­‐‑Liberal	  Democratic	  coalition	  pursued	  austerity	  measures	  with	  the	  assumption	  that	   the	  private	  sector	  will	  step	  in	   to	  provide	  jobs	   for	   the	   large	   numbers	   of	   unemployed	   as	   a	   result.	   But	   the	   real	   priority	   for	   the	  Coalition	  and	  subsequent	  Conservative	  government,	  elected	  in	  2015,	  has	  been	  to	  satisfy	  the	   financial	   elite,	   bond	   markets	   and	   financial	   assessors.	   The	   British	   government’s	  policies	   reflect	   a	   renewal	   and	   deepening	   of	   neoliberalisation	   in	   the	   context	   of	   the	  current	   financial	   crisis	   and	   persistent	   economic	   recession	   (Hall	   2011).	   	   This	  intensification	   of	   neoliberal	   policy	   measures,	   based	   on	   punitive	   conditionality	   and	  economic	  rationality,	  has	  been	  portrayed	  by	  tehse	  governments	  as	  necessary	  to	  restore	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Britain’s	  economic	  competitiveness.	  However,	  the	  large	  scale	  public	  spending	  cuts	  have	  disproportionately	  affected	  poorer	  communities	  the	  most.	  	  	  Race	  has	  not	  been	  mentioned	  overtly	  by	  the	  Coalition	  and	  Conservative	  governments,	  but	   the	   continuation	  of	  debates	  about	   forced	  marriages,	   ‘extremism’	  and	   immigration,	  against	   the	   backloth	   of	   US	   led	   regime-­‐‑change	   operations	   in	   the	   middle	   East,	   have	  targeted	  racialised	  groups,	  namely	  Muslims	  and	  asylum-­‐‑seekers.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  the	  targeted	   cutting	   of	   public	   services,	   has	   and	   will,	   disproportionately	   affect	   all	  disadvantaged	  groups	  but	  especially	  poorer	  ethnic	  minorities	  because	  of	  their	  reliance	  on	   public	   services.	   	   	   	   Unemployment	   has	   risen	   for	   all	   groups	   since	   2010	   but	   more	  sharply	   for	   ethnic	  minorities.	   Prisons,	   seem	   to	   be	   getting	   younger,	   blacker	   and	  more	  Muslim	  (Shaw	  2015).	  	  There	  is	  a	  growing	  income	  gap	  between	  rich	  and	  poor	  in	  the	  UK.	  All	  these	  are	  indicators	  of	  deepening	  economic	  recession	  and	  decline.	  	  	  Surveillance	  and	  control	  measures	  have	  become	  widespread	  and	  the	  battle	  against	  ‘extremism’	  has	  been	  the	   justification	   for	   embedding	   ever	   tightening	   control	  measures	   that	   target	   the	   very	  communities	  that	  are	  at	  the	  sharp	  end	  of	  	  economic	  decline.	  	  	  	  
Conclusion	  	  Muslim	   boys	   represent	   a	   social	   threat	   at	   a	   time	   of	   significant	   economic,	   political	   and	  cultural	   global	   change.	   Their	   emergence	   as	   folk	   devils	   is	   located	   in	   the	   global	   shifts	  marked	  by	  the	  end	  of	  Cold	  War	  politics	  and	  the	  emergence	  of	  Islamism	  as	  a	  new,	  global	  enemy.	   In	   Britain,	   the	   manufacturing	   base	   that	   attracted	   immigrant	   workers	   in	   the	  1960s	  to	  settle	  in	  industrial	  towns	  and	  cities	  declined	  significantly,	  causing	  widespread	  unemployment	  and	  accompanying	  disadvantage	  in	  educational	  and	  labour	  markets	  for	  the	  later	  generations.	  	  The	  ‘war	  on	  terror’,	  the	  ideological	  justification	  for	  the	  US	  neo-­‐‑conservative	  Project	  for	  a	  New	  American	  century	   (Harvey	  2003),	  has	  had	  profound	   implications	   for	  Muslims.	   In	  Britain,	   the	   Pakistani	   and	   Bangladeshi	   communities	   –	   already	   among	   the	   most	  disadvantaged	  of	   ethnic	  minority	   communities	  –have	  been	   subject	   to	   intense	   scrutiny	  and	  surveillance	  in	  debates	  about	  ‘extremism’	  and	  the	  limits	  of	  multiculturalism.	  These	  debates	  have	  been	  particularly	  heated	  since	  the	  inner	  city	  disturbances	  in	  2001	  and	  the	  London	  transport	  bombings	   in	  2005.	   	  Muslim	  boys	  have	  emerged	  as	  symbols	  of	  crisis	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and	   change	   against	   this	   backdrop,	   and	   arguments	   about	   their	   supposed	  underachievement	  in	  the	  educational	  and	  labour	  market	  have	  been	  used	  to	  underscore	  dominant	  discourses	  of	  dangerous	  and	  violent	  masculinity.	  	  	  	  While	   global	   enemies	   have	   changed	   and	   the	   targets	   containment	   and	   control	   policies	  have	   shifted	   over	   the	   course	   of	   the	   last	   50	   years	   in	   the	   UK,	   there	   has	   been	   through	  British	   state	   policy	   pronouncements,	   a	   persistent	   desire	   to	   reconnect	   with	   Britain’s	  imperial	  past.	  	  Against	  the	  background	  of	  rising	  unemployment	  and	  growing	  economic	  uncertainty,	   repeated	   appeals	   to	   Britishness	   come	   at	   a	   time	   when	   Britain’s	   imperial	  power	   and	   status	   as	   a	   leading	   Western	   economy	   is	   being	   challenged	   by	   strong	  competition	   from	   countries	   such	   as	   China	   and	   India	   and	   other	   emerging	   economies	  (Gowan	  2009,	  Gokay	  2009).	  The	  forging	  of	  a	  renewed	  British	  identity	  can	  be	  read	  in	  this	  context	   as	   melancholic	   (Gilroy	   2004)	   and	   as	   an	   ideological	   mechanism	   to	   deflect	  attention	   from	  a	  British	  economy	   in	  decline.	  Patriotic	   appeals	   to	  a	  mythic	  Britishness	  can	  be	   seen	   to	   support	   the	   illusion	  of	   a	   cohesive	   society	  at	   a	   time	  when	  disadvantage	  and	   class	   inequalities	   threaten	   to	   become	   stark	   as	   a	   result	   of	   savage	   cuts	   to	   public	  funding	   in	   the	   context	   of	   significant	   economic	   decline.	   	   Young	   Muslims	   are	   visible	  	  symbols	  of	  this	  crisis	  and	  decline.	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